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I. Abstract 
This paper examines the efficiency of pricing in the NFL point spread betting 
market, as hypothesized by the Efficient Market Hypothesis, through both statistical and 
economic tests. This market provides a simpler framework to test such economic 
hypotheses than conventional financial markets. Using a larger sample size than past 
literature, this paper finds that while the market is efficient in the aggregate sense, there 
are still some profit opportunities which imply pricing inefficiencies.  
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I. Introduction 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), first formalized in 1970 by Eugene 
Fama, states that financial markets are “informationally efficient”. The primary 
implication of this hypothesis is that in the face of uncertainty the price of a good serves 
as an unbiased predictor of the good’s future value given all publically available 
information. In inefficient markets, in contrast, there are better alternative ways to gauge 
the value of a good, and this asymmetry can be exploited for profits. Empirically testing 
the EMH, however, is a difficult task; because of the arbitrarily long time between the 
purchase of a good at its original price and the realization of its value at sale it is hard to 
determine if the price of the good was accurate. Beginning with Lyn D. Pankoff in 1968 
economists identified the NFL point spread betting market as an analogue to financial 
markets for the purposes of testing market efficiency. Subsequent research has branched 
into other point spread betting markets as well. (Woodland 1994, Woodland 2001, 
Gandar 2001). 
While unintuitive, the NFL spreads market has some important similarities to 
financial markets that enable this comparison. In both markets the information regarding 
past performance and price (spread) of a good (bet) is publicly available, the final value 
of the good is unknown at the time of purchase, and many self-interested parties are in 
competition. The NFL market however, in contrast to financial markets, has a defined 
end period, after which the true value of the good is realized to everyone. This finality 
allows for much more straightforward testing of the EMH. 
Previous research has produced mixed results regarding the market’s efficiency, 
with inefficiencies being relatively minor and transient (Sauer 1998). This paper expands 
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on past research on the efficiency of the NFL spreads market by using a larger sample 
size than most, twenty one years of regular season games, in order to better assess the 
existence of profitable market inefficiencies, even if price is an efficient indicator of 
value in aggregate. As expected given past literature, the NFL point spreads betting 
market between 1992 and 2012 is efficient in the aggregate sense; Las Vegas point 
spreads are an unbiased, minimum variance estimator of final point differences. Despite 
this general market efficiency, however, certain betting strategies were found to be 
profitable over this time period, indicating that certain market inefficiencies do exist. In 
the next section an overview of the NFL point spread betting market is provided. Section 
II contains an overview of the structure of the NFL point spread betting market, Section 
III contains a review of past literature, Sections IV-VI contain methodology, data, and 
results. Section VII summarizes the paper. 
II. The NFL Point Spread Betting Market 
The most common bet placed on NFL games is a straight bet. In this betting 
format, a bettor chooses to bet on a team based on a published handicap called the 
“spread” or “line”. Suppose team A is playing team B and the line has team A favored by 
five points. Traditionally, this line will be published as “Team A -5”1. A bet on team A 
will win (also called “covering the spread”) if team A wins the game by six or more 
points. The opposite bet, “Team B +5”, will win (“cover the spread”) if either team B 
wins the game, or if team B loses by four or fewer points. In the event that team A wins 
                                                          
1
 This definition of the line, being expressed from the perspective of the favorite team, is 
the most common format published by odds makers. Lines can also be expressed relative 
to the home team. 
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by exactly five points, the bet is a “push” and the money bet at this line is refunded2. The 
payouts for this type of straight bet operate under the “eleven for ten” rule; in order to 
win $10 a bettor must risk $11
3
. This 10% commission is called the vigorish and serves 
to compensate the book maker. In order for a bettor to break even with betting unit x and 
vigorish v the bettor must win with probability p such that: 
p × x = (1 – p) × ((1 + v) × x) (1) 
When v is 10%, as is commonplace, this equation can be solved to find that the bettor 
must pick winning bets 52.38 percent of the time. Similarly, given a winning percentage 
of p, a bettor’s profits π per unit bet x can be calculated using the following formula: 
π = (p × x) – ((1 – p) × (1 + v) × x) (2) 
While the above example explains how a single bet works, the point spread 
betting market as a whole has a much longer life cycle. Traditionally, a small group of 
line makers in Las Vegas will come to a consensus early in the week and publish an 
“opening” spread or line. This opening spread is then adopted by (virtually) every sports 
book such that the different books all open with a consistent line. Traditional wisdom 
says that this opening line is chosen in order to draw an even volume of bets on each side 
of the line by the time the book is closed to additional bets
4
. If this is achieved then the 
                                                          
2
 It is worth noting that spreads can be set to half points, such as “Team A -3.5” in order 
to avoid pushes. 
3
 In the past, and possibly in modern day illegal gambling, the vigorish collected by book 
makers went as high as 20%, and “push” bets were collected by the book keeper instead 
of refunded. 
4
 Levitt (2004) and Paul et al. (2011) suggest that book makers may not choose spreads to 
equalize betting but instead to maximize book profits. The implications of this new 
research with regards to betting strategies will be addressed later in the paper. For the 
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book maker will risklessly profit from the vigorish collected on losing bets, while 
covering all of the winning bets with revenues from losing bets. 
In this sense the opening line is not chosen to be a predictor of the final game 
point differential. If line makers predict that the public will bet irrationally then they can 
select a spread in such a way that despite the public’s biases, the total volume of bets will 
be roughly equal. For example, if line makers predict that bettors will overly bet on a 
favored New York team (due to extreme loyalty), they could set the opening line at “New 
York -5” even though the truly unbiased prediction of the outcome is “New York -4”. By 
effectively raising the price of betting on New York (by making the criteria for payoff 
more difficult), line makers counteract the biased public, resulting in more even books. 
On the other hand, line makers must also be wary of sophisticated bettors who are likely 
to take advantage of these line biases. The opening line should then reflect the relative 
weights that line makers give the uninformed public bettor versus the expert bettor. 
After the opening line is posted betting begins. As bets flow in the spread may 
change in order to incentivize bettors to bet one way or another. If, for example, a large 
number of bets come in for “Team A -5” the book maker may change the spread for 
future bets to “Team A -6”. At this new betting line team A will have to win by an even 
greater margin in order for a bet on team A to pay off, effectively increasing the “price” 
of a bet on A and decreasing the “price” of a bet on B at the new spread. This change in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
purposes of introducing the point spread betting market the traditional view of book 
makers as unbiased brokers will be used. 
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price should cause more bets to come in for team B, balancing the book
5
. Additionally, 
new information, such as injury reports or weather forecasts, may arise during the week 
which causes the spread to shift. Regardless of why shifts in the spread might happen, 
one key aspect of point spread betting is that once a bet is made at a certain spread the bet 
is locked in at that spread. This contrasts with some other betting styles such as the Pari-
Mutuel system used in horse racing
6
. At the end of the betting period, usually minutes 
before the game starts, sports books stop taking bets. The final spread at the time of 
closing, and the one used in this paper, is usually called the closing line or public line. 
The closing line should, in aggregate, reflect the public’s betting preferences. 
III. Literature Review 
The past literature regarding the efficiency of the NFL point spread betting market 
is very mixed. Many authors claim to have found either statistical evidence of market 
efficiency, or economic evidence of inefficiency (in the form of profitable betting 
patterns). The first meaningful work analyzing the NFL point spread betting market was 
done by Pankoff (1968) in an attempt to test market efficiency. Pankoff tested the 
                                                          
5
 One potential outcome of adjusting spreads in an attempt to balance books is that the 
book maker can get “middled”. Continuing the example above, if the betting public did 
not bet at the new spread of “Team A -6”, the book maker might adjust the spread again 
to “Team A -7”. If this newest spread finally attracts bettors for team B the book maker is 
exposed to a risky situation if team A wins by 6. In this case, team A covers the spread at 
the original line of -5, while team B covers the spread at the new line of +7. The book 
keeper then has to pay out bets to those on each side. Superbowl XIII is infamous due to 
a large number of books getting “middled” and losing large sums of money on the game. 
Most books now are extremely hesitant to move more than three or four points for fear of 
this phenomenon. 
6
 In Pari-Mutuel betting the odds change continuously based on how bets are being 
placed, and all bettors who take a certain bet are exposed to the final odds, regardless of 
the odds when they first made the bet.  
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efficiency of the market by regressing the actual point spread of a game against the Las 
Vegas line for the game. Additionally, Pankoff also tested if certain “superior analysts” 
exist, as the ability for certain analysts to consistently beat the spread implies that some 
information about the market is not accurately captured in the price of a bet. Over the 
1956-1965 NFL seasons, Pankoff was unable to reject market rationality in the aggregate 
sense using a regression. Interestingly, Pankoff found some evidence to suggest that 
“superior analysts” may exist, indicating market inefficiencies which were too nuanced 
for his first analysis to detect. 
 Vergin and Scriabin (1978) were among the first to produce reasonable evidence 
that the NFL point spread betting market was inefficient. In their paper, Vergin and 
Scriabin opted to test for market efficiency by analyzing the profitability of certain 
betting strategies over the 1969-1974 NFL seasons. If certain betting strategies could 
consistently produce a profit, the market must not be efficient. Vergin and Scriabin used a 
number of betting strategies such as betting the underdog or trying to identify teams that 
recently changed in performance. The pair found some of their strategies to be both 
profitable and statistically significant, and concluded that there must be some inefficiency 
in the pricing of bets. Tryfos et al. (1984) responded to the Vergin and Scriabin (1978) 
paper by highlighting statistical errors which resulted in some “profitable” strategies 
incorrectly being labeled as statistically significant. 
 Zuber, Gandar, and Bowers (1985) tested the “simple” hypothesis for market 
rationality (that the intercept and slope of the linear regression of actual game spreads on 
Las Vegas spreads are jointly zero and one) using the 1983 NFL season as data. They 
could not reject rationality based on this regression. They also tested an ‘extreme’ 
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alternative hypothesis that betting lines were completely unrelated to the final spread and 
determined that this hypothesis could not be rejected for fifteen of the sixteen weeks in 
the season. Zuber, Gandar, and Bowers (1985) also tested a regression model which 
collected data from the first half of the 1983 season and used it to predict bets with a 58.8 
winning percentage over the second half of the season. 
 Despite the strong results found by Zuber, Gandar, and Bowers in 1985, Sauer, 
Brajer, Ferris, and Marr (1988) found evidence that these results did not hold when 
considered more generally. Firstly, Sauer et al. (1988) highlighted that by splitting the 
single season of data into weeks, Zuber et al. (1985) artificially increased the variance of 
the estimators and made it more likely that the ‘extreme’ hypothesis (that final spread and 
Las Vegas spread were completely unrelated) could not be rejected. Furthermore, Sauer 
et al. found that the predictive model proposed by Zuber, Gandar, and Bowers provided 
no additional information when compared to strictly using the Las Vegas spread as an 
indicator of outcome. They also found that this model did not produce profitable bets 
when used out-of-sample. 
 Later in 1988 Gandar, Zuber, O’Brien, and Russo released a paper that attempted 
to overcome some of the statistical shortcomings of their earlier work, in addition to 
providing more robust economic tests of market efficiency over the 1980-1985 seasons. 
Gandar et al. did not find statistical evidence to reject market efficiency. Some economic 
tests used bettor behavior (primarily through observation of spreads changing between 
open and close) and were able to consistently see profit. This paper, however, does not 
draw on changes in the line between open and close; data collection for historic spread 
movement is much harder to collect than closing lines, and thus would limit this sample. 
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 Golec and Tamarkin (1991) attempted to address some of the area’s previous 
statistical shortcomings by including two dummy variables for home/away and 
favorite/underdog in the standard test for market rationality tested by others previously 
(that the intercept and slope of actual spread on Las Vegas spread were 0 and 1 
respectively). By including these two dummy variables Golec and Tamarkin seemed to 
capture bettor biases in a way that previous research had not. By applying these biases to 
betting strategies, Golec and Tamarkin conclude that in addition to being statistically 
inefficient, the NFL point spread betting market also was economically inefficient. The 
pair managed to highlight profitable betting strategies (bet on home underdogs) over the 
1973-1987 seasons. Golec and Tamarkin did not find these same strategies profitable on 
college point spread betting, presumably due to a higher percentage of informed bettors 
as opposed to uninformed masses. 
 Sauer (1998) published a comprehensive literature review on wagering markets. 
This review covered a number of sports and gambling markets and concluded that in 
general these markets are efficient. Sauer’s specific critiques and suggestions regarding 
future research in this field are noted as they occur. 
 Summers (2008) published an article in which he attempted to analyze the 
effectiveness of more complicated betting strategies, principally the effectiveness of 
aiming for “middles” (betting on each team at a different spread in hopes of winning both 
bets) on games. Summers found some evidence to suggest that this more complicated 
strategy could produce profits over time, but fails to reproduce any of the profits previous 
authors found with more simplistic betting strategies. Summers did not, however, explore 
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simple betting strategies which used partitions in an attempt to find more statistically 
significant inefficiencies. 
 While not directly related to identifying profitable betting strategies, Levitt (2004) 
provided evidence via a betting tournament that suggested that book makers did not set 
lines in an attempt to balance their books. Levitt used data that not only included 
information on the spreads of games, but also on the volume of bets placed on each side 
of the line. Levitt claims that book makers are better at predicting outcomes than the 
general public, and thus are able to set spreads in such a way that the majority of bets 
lose, increasing book maker profits. As identified in the explanation of how books are 
made, this change in price must be balanced with the potential for experienced bettors to 
take advantage of the situation. While Levitt’s results limit the ability to apply efficient 
market hypothesis results from the betting market to more traditional markets (where the 
book keepers are actually neutral), they do provide evidence of systematic bias that may 
be exploitable. 
 Paul and Weinbach (2011) expand on Levitt’s (2004) evidence by analyzing the 
same phenomenon with a broader sample. While Levitt was constrained to a betting 
tournament with slightly different incentives than normal betting, Paul and Weinbach 
were able to obtain betting-volume data for two NFL seasons. Using regressions, Paul 
and Weinbach provide evidence that the volume of bets on games was systematically 
biased in a way that provided book makers with more profits than would be realized with 
an even book. In their paper Paul and Weinbach also identify some simple betting 
strategies that were profitable (wagering on underdogs). 
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 As mentioned at the beginning of this literature review, the findings of past 
research into the efficiency of NFL point spread betting markets provides mixed signals. 
Many authors have found profitable betting strategies, indicating inefficiency, only to 
have subsequent authors provide contrasting results. One potential reason for this 
inconsistent nature of past research could be sample sizes that are too small to allow 
accurate measurement of some proposed inefficiencies. This paper aims to solve this 
concern by using a larger sample. 
IV. Methodology 
As explored by previous literature there are a number of ways to test the 
efficiency of the NFL betting market. In general, these tests fall under two categories: 
statistical tests and economic tests. Statistical tests aim to identify whether or not the 
predicted point spread is an unbiased, minimum variance estimator of realized point 
spreads, as required by EMH. Sauer (1998) and Gandar et al. (1988) represent this 
requirement using equation (3), where Ω represents the set of all relevant information, PS 
represents the Las Vegas point spread, and DP represents the actual difference in points: 
 
E(DP-PS | Ω) = 0 (3) 
The veracity of equation (3) will be analyzed in the context of the following linear 
prediction model:  
DP = α · I + β · PS + ε (4) 
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Where I is a vector of ones, α and β are regression coefficients and ε is an error term. 
This representation of equation (3) has been used many times in the past literature to test 
the efficiency of the point spreads betting market; the joint hypothesis that α = 0 and β = 
1 implies market efficiency. Coefficients deviating from 0 and 1 indicate that there is 
some inefficiency in the market. 
Alternatively, economic tests aim to identify betting strategies that produce 
consistent profits, as this should be impossible under the EMH. This condition is 
motivated by the idea that in a gambling market the book makers and betting public can 
not both make profits. Sauer (1998) represents this constraint using equation (5): 
1/(2 + τ) ≤ p ≤ (1 + τ)/(2 + τ) (5) 
Where p represents the probability of a certain bet winning and τ represents the difference 
from 1 to 1 odds.
7
 Using this framework one can see that in a gambling market without 
vigorisih (τ = 0) the absence of a profit opportunity requires 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 0.5; if p lies outside 
these bounds then a profit could be realized. Therefore in the case of 0 vigorish any value 
such that p ≠ 0.5 indicates that there are profitable opportunities. When the odds are 10 to 
11, as in NFL point spreads betting, τ = 0.1. Under this scenario unprofitability requires 
that 0.476 ≤ p ≤ 0.524; if p lies outside these bounds then a profit could be realized. The 
symmetry around p = 0.5 is due to the nature of bets; if the probability of a certain bet 
winning is 0.3, the probability of the opposite position of the same bet winning is 0.7. 
This bounding of unprofitable winning bet probabilities makes economic tests of market 
efficiency fairly straightforward. If a betting strategy can be identified to have a 
                                                          
7
 For example, in the case of NFL betting spreads τ would be 0.1, as book makers set 
odds to be 1 to 1.1 (10 to 11). 
Spinosa 16 
 
statistically significant probability of winning, p, which lies outside of the bounded range 
then the market must have some inefficiencies which can be exploited for profits. 
V. Data 
The data used in this paper are historical public data for the twenty one NFL 
seasons between years 1992-2012, and obtained from PRO-FOOTBALL-
REFERENCE.COM. The Las Vegas lines used were compiled from PFR into a more 
accessible format hosted by Aragorn Technologies. Additionally the final scores of each 
team, home team designation, and dates were collected. In total this generated data for 
5,192 NFL regular season observations and 231 playoff observations. For the purposes of 
this paper playoff games are not analyzed; the single elimination nature of playoff games, 
differences in player incentives (both directly and indirectly via future contracts), and 
modified rule set (especially with regards to home designation) seem to justify this 
exclusion. 
As noted earlier, the spread and outcome of a game can be defined ambiguously; 
which frame of reference used can significantly alter the characteristics of the data and 
the analysis that follows. While far from an exhaustive explanation, consider the 
following proofs of concept: if the spread used in a game is viewed from the perspective 
of the favorite it has a maximum value of 0 (a “pick ‘em” game). Alternatively, when 
defined from the perspective of the home team the spread will take on negative values 
when the home team is favored and positive values when the home team is the underdog. 
Similarly, the final spread of the game can be defined relative to either team. One 
interesting caveat to these differences is that when using the favorite/underdog 
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perspective no analysis can be done when the spread is zero (it is ambiguous which team 
should be labeled as the favorite). As such, any analysis from this frame of reference 
must exclude pick ‘em games, which can be included from the home-away perspective. 
Summary statistics are given in Table 1. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the frequency 
distributions of the differences between actual differences in points (DP) and Vegas point 
spreads (PS); these graphs test equation (3). Overlaid on both of these figures is a normal 
distribution curve for comparison in addition to a kernel density estimate of the data. The 
means of DP-PS are not statistically significantly different from zero, regardless of the 
frame of reference used.  
The difference in games per season is a result of the franchise expansions that 
took place during this time period. Regardless of the frame of reference used for the 
spreads, the mean of the Las Vegas predicted spread (PS) is extremely close to the mean 
of final spreads (DP). Additionally, the standard deviation of Las Vegas spreads is 
significantly lower than the standard deviation of final game spreads. 
VI. Results of Efficiency Tests 
Statistical Tests 
The results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (4) for each 
year in the data set, in addition to all years in aggregate are presented in Table 2. This 
estimation uses spreads from the home/away frame of reference. Before detailed analysis 
of these results, however, it is worth discussing the statistics presented in Table 1 again. 
As noted above, the mean for predicted and observed spreads were approximately even 
(especially when years were aggregated together), and the standard deviation of predicted 
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spreads was lower than the standard deviation of final spreads (for every year 
individually and in aggregate). Both of these characteristics are required if the model 
suggested by equation (4) is a minimum-variance, unbiased estimator of final spreads as 
the EMH would require. 
 The coefficients of the OLS regression of DP on PS presented in Table 2 also 
meet the requirements set forth by efficient markets. Intercept refers to the constant, α, 
from equation (4), and slope refers to the coefficient on PS, β. In an efficient market the 
intercept, α, will be insignificantly different from zero. This condition holding implies 
that PS is an unbiased predictor of DP; the Las Vegas predicted spread will not be 
systematically above or below the actual spread. Relatedly, in an efficient market the 
slope, β, will be insignificantly different from one. This condition holding implies that 
changes in the magnitude of the actual difference in points, DP, are predicted as 
consistently as possible by changes in the Vegas spread, PS. If both of these conditions 
hold true, then the model expressed in equation (4) provides an efficient estimation which 
proportionally reflects changes in magnitude of DP, without being systematically biased. 
When considered separately all but one of the intercept terms are insignificantly 
different from zero. The intercept exception is in 2006, where the intercept was 
shockingly large at 1.69. I offer no explanation as to why this outlier exists. The slope 
term from every year was insignificantly different from one. Similarly, when viewed in 
aggregate the intercept is insignificantly different from zero and the slope is 
insignificantly different from one. F-tests of the joint null hypothesis that [α,β] are jointly 
[0,1] are also shown in Table 2. These tests confirm for all but two years, 2005 and 2006, 
and in aggregate that this estimation is unable to reject the null hypothesis of market 
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efficiency represented by the joint null hypothesis. Years 2005 and 2006 reject this 
hypothesis at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. While far from a comprehensive 
explanation of this result, it is worth noting that 2005 had the most extreme (distance 
from 1.0) slope coefficient and 2006 had the most extreme (distance from 0) intercept. 
 Despite these two years, overall the results reported in Table 2 do not contradict 
the hypothesis that the NFL point spread betting market is efficient. This result is not 
surprising; the majority of past research has indicated that the market is efficient in this 
aggregate sense. One weakness of this method of determining market efficiency is that 
equation (4) is sensitive to how the point spread is defined, and biases can exist that are 
not reflected in the aggregate coefficients. Sauer (1998) provides an eloquent explanation 
of this phenomenon (DP = final point spread, PS = Vegas predicted point spread): 
Suppose that 2/3 of the games consist of favorites playing at home, and that 
favorites at home are overbet on average by one point (i.e. that E(DP – PS) = -1 in 
this sub-sample). In the remaining 1/3 of the games the home team is an 
underdog, and suppose these teams are underbet by two points. The reciprocal 
nature of point differences implies that favorites playing away are overbet by two 
points. Thus, in the full sample, all favorites are overbet, on average, by 1.67 
points. But when point differences are constructed on a home-away basis, the 
sample means of DP and PS are the same – the two biases posited above cancel 
exactly. It follows that a regression based on [equation (4)] using home-away 
point differences will fail to detect what is, by construction, an obvious case of 
mispricing. (p. 2053) 
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Thus, the above statistical test for efficiency is not sufficient to conclude market 
efficiency. Perhaps the simplest way to uncover these potentially canceling biases is to 
use partition-based economic tests of market efficiency. 
Economic Tests 
As mentioned above, a simple and effective way to identify inefficiencies that 
arise from complications involving variable definition in statistical models is to use 
partition-based economic tests. This style of test applies different betting strategies (such 
as bet on the favorite to cover the spread) to the games and records wins/losses. In the 
event a specific strategy exploits inefficiency in the market the strategy will exhibit 
statistically significant returns. Table 3 presents data from the NFL betting market using 
both the home/away and favorite/underdog perspectives, and all partitions of these 
orderings. The table also includes pick ‘em games, which have to be evaluated under the 
home/away perspective. Panel A of Table 3 tests equation (5) and finds that one betting 
strategy, betting on the home team in pick ‘em games, wins with a percentage outside of 
the bounds of unprofitability required by equation (5). As shown by the t-statistic this 
result is not statistically significant at any conventional level of confidence. 
Despite these first partitions of games not displaying signs of any significantly 
profitable betting strategies, there are other ways the data can be divided which may 
uncover more profitable betting strategies. One hypothesis that has shown promising yet 
inconsistent results over previous research (Vergin and Scriabin 1978, Tryfos et al 1984) 
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is betting on big home underdogs
8. This strategy assumes that the betting public’s 
inability to accurately judge home underdogs actually increases as the spread increases. 
When using the home/away perspective of point spreads, home underdogs can be 
identified by those games where the point spread is positive. Table 4 presents data on 
home underdogs, broken down into bins by the size of the predicted spread. The bins 
selected are based on the common scoring increments in football: games that are 
expected to be within one field goal, games that are expected to be within one touchdown 
and games that are expected to be decided by more than one possession. 
For now, ignore the right columns that have non-zero values for “Spread 
Advantage”. The results presented in Table 4 highlight a profound result regarding NFL 
point spread betting markets: large home underdogs are consistently and statistically 
significantly underbet. Betting on underdogs to cover the spread when they are 
handicapped by over 7 points results in a winning percentage of 59.69%, far beyond the 
52.4% required by equation (5). This result, unlike the home team pick ‘em betting 
strategy, is significant at the 1% level. Table 5 presents the effectiveness of this betting 
strategy on a year by year basis. As seen in Table 5, the number of games in which the 
home team is also the underdog by at least 7 points is rather rare, only 12.5 games per 
year on average. This low sample size per year makes it difficult to do meaningful 
analysis on this betting strategy without having a large number of years to pool data from. 
This could be a contributing factor to this market inefficiency being relatively 
undocumented, despite its strong statistical significance and deviation from unprofitable 
                                                          
8
 To clarify: betting that home teams to cover their point spread when they are large 
underdogs ( PS > 0 when viewed from the home perspective). 
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bounding. Vergin and Scriabin (1978) were the first to highlight large home underdogs as 
a potential profit opportunity; however, they defined large home underdogs as those with 
a spread of 5 or greater, rather than 7 or greater. As such, subsequent validation of their 
results has used the same metric and determined this betting strategy to be unprofitable. 
When the same definition is applied to this data set, the win percentage drops to just 
52.98%, with significance at the 39% level; this result is much less interesting. 
One area also explored by Vergin and Scriabin (1978) is the effect point spread 
advantages might have on profitable betting strategies. Point spread advantages are 
situations in which one can make a bet at a spread that is markedly different from the 
public line. Vergin and Scriabin introduced this idea through the lens of betting 
syndicates, which use coordinated bettors across broad geographical regions to place bets 
at the most advantageous odds available to members of the syndicate. In modern times 
organized betting syndicates are less practical, but another force exists which allows for a 
more varied set of spreads to be available. With the rise of the internet, and with it online 
gambling, the barriers to entry for new book makers are lower, as many of the costs 
associated with running a gambling service are unnecessary when the service is online
9
. 
Due to the potential influx of online gambling books, it is not unreasonable to consider 
that the books may attempt to differentiate themselves with their competitors by offering 
mildly different prices on bets from one another. Bettors may be able to take advantage of 
this situation by placing their bets at certain sports books which have lower prices for 
                                                          
9
 There are still large barriers to entry, however. The legality of online gambling is 
constantly in flux as new rules and regulations are put in place in different jurisdictions. 
Regardless, the ability for new gambling services to enter the market has increased. 
Services such as Perhead white labeling (www.perhead.com) offer rental software 
designed to run sportsbooks. 
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certain betting positions. To consider the effects of this potential shift in the market, the 
Spread Advantage columns were added to Table 4. 
In this hypothetical situation home underdogs who have a spread of 3 or higher 
are considered.
10
 In these games it is assumed that, due to competition from competing 
gambling services, a bettor is able to find a sports book that is offering an extra 0.5, 1, 
1.5, and 2 points respectively in favor of the home underdog
11
. The data shown in the 
additional columns of Table 4 shows the effects of this hypothetical situation. As 
required, win percentages increase as additional points versus the spread are gained. The 
statistical significant of these betting strategy winning percentages naturally increases as 
well. 
VII. Conclusion 
The NFL point spreads betting market provides an interesting analogue to more 
complicated financial markets. This analogous nature allows tests of economic theory 
such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which is traditionally hard to test the validity of, 
to be carried out with relative ease. By testing the efficiency of market pricing in the NFL 
point spreads betting market, conclusions can be drawn about pricing and the assumption 
of “informationally efficient”. Early researchers in the NFL betting market used both 
                                                          
10
 When games are partitioned based on |PS| into the bins specified in Table 4, it is shown 
that the standard deviation of DP increases when |PS| increases. This suggests that higher 
spread games are harder to predict, and so book makers may be more likely to offer 
varied lines. 
11
 Increasing the value of a spread will always benefit the team in question, regardless of 
whether or not they are favored. Covering the spread is calculated by the truth of this 
statement: DP < PS, where DP is difference in points at the conclusion of the game, and 
PS is the predicted point spread. Increasing PS by a spread advantage must make this 
condition easier to satisfy. 
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statistical tests, in the form of regressions, and economic tests, in the form of betting 
strategies, to discern the efficiency of the market. Over time, these results have been 
mixed, with initial results of profitable inefficiency being contradicted by later tests of the 
same nature. 
 This paper attempts to extend this analysis of simple betting strategies to modern 
day, when access to much larger data sets is more common. By using twenty one years of 
NFL game and spreads data, this paper overcomes some of the faults of earlier analyses 
which were limited by smaller sample sizes. The first notable finding of this paper is that 
the NFL point spreads betting market is efficient in aggregate. This finding confirms past 
research in the field still holds true when applied to more modern data sets. The second 
notable finding of this paper is that home team underdogs are consistently undervalued 
by the market, and a profitable betting strategy can be employed by betting for home 
underdogs to cover spreads of at least 7. This bet is successful far more frequently than is 
suggested by an efficient market with the structure of the NFL spreads market, and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. While not an exhaustive exploration of every 
possible betting strategy, this result signifies that some market inefficiencies do exist, and 
that further exploration of the subject using more modern data still has the ability to 
produce meaningful new information. 
 This paper also briefly explores how the changing dynamics of sports books, in 
light of the expanding internet age, impact betting strategies. Modern software has 
lowered the barriers to entry in the sports book market, allowing more sports books to 
operate. Analysis regarding the impact of additional spread advantages (a likely 
byproduct of sports book competition) suggests that increased competition between 
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sports books has the potential to increase profitable betting opportunities. One similar 
field of study that was not explored is the impact of lowering vigorish, a second likely 
outcome of sports book competition, on the profitability of certain betting strategies. 
 Further work in this field is called for, especially when considering the 
implementation of more complex betting strategies that leverage inefficiencies which are 
too subtle for the analysis in this paper to pick up on. An increased body of knowledge 
regarding the NFL point spread betting market will further our understanding of prices 
and the forces which contribute to them. 
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VIII. Appendix 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of NFL Game Data for 1992-2012 Seasons 
  
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1992-2012
N
um
ber O
f Gam
es
224
224
224
240
240
240
240
248
248
248
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
5192
Fave. Covers Spread
107
97
99
107
109
103
121
110
112
110
110
123
122
142
109
128
123
121
119
117
118
2497
Hom
e Covers Spread
111
104
103
116
128
111
129
122
112
120
127
127
117
122
123
128
113
116
124
123
121
2407
Pick 'em
 Gam
es
4
3
2
4
3
4
4
4
5
3
2
3
4
5
2
2
0
0
5
0
2
61
Pushes
3
6
5
5
5
9
10
9
7
11
5
9
5
10
5
8
6
8
5
10
4
145
Vegas Favorite M
ean
-6.66
-6.00
-5.15
-5.59
-5.40
-5.13
-5.72
-5.47
-5.69
-5.20
-5.00
-5.08
-5.24
-5.15
-5.59
-5.89
-5.66
-6.70
-5.14
-5.77
-5.27
-5.61
(Standard Deviation)
(4.24)
(3.73)
(3.50)
(3.56)
(3.28)
(3.20)
(3.49)
(3.42)
(3.56)
(3.23)
(3.01)
(2.82)
(2.81)
(3.38)
(3.50)
(4.04)
(3.48)
(4.01)
(3.12)
(3.63)
(3.25)
(3.48)
Actual Favorite M
ean
-6.37
-4.90
-3.80
-4.44
-4.85
-3.82
-7.05
-4.87
-5.96
-5.11
-4.20
-6.36
-5.02
-7.96
-3.67
-6.61
-6.30
-7.11
-5.33
-5.68
-5.63
-5.49
(Standard Deviation)
(14.22)
(13.64)
(12.83)
(12.78)
(13.71)
(13.97)
(12.74)
(13.68)
(13.78)
(13.30)
(13.64)
(13.76)
(13.35)
(12.93)
(13.86)
(14.24)
(14.15)
(15.00)
(14.28)
(14.44)
(14.69)
(13.84)
Vegas Hom
e M
ean
-2.86
-2.86
-2.94
-2.49
-2.90
-2.42
-2.48
-2.36
-2.57
-2.26
-2.19
-2.45
-2.52
-2.50
-2.90
-2.32
-2.69
-2.51
-2.34
-2.41
-2.19
-2.53
(Standard Deviation)
(7.39)
(6.48)
(5.50)
(6.17)
(5.63)
(5.57)
(6.25)
(6.03)
(6.23)
(5.71)
(5.42)
(5.28)
(5.42)
(5.65)
(5.93)
(6.77)
(6.08)
(7.39)
(5.57)
(6.38)
(5.80)
(6.06)
Actual Hom
e M
ean
-2.98
-2.78
-1.50
-2.03
-3.72
-2.80
-3.50
-3.06
-2.82
-2.01
-2.25
-3.55
-2.51
-3.65
-0.85
-2.87
-2.56
-2.21
-1.89
-3.27
-2.43
-2.63
(Standard Deviation)
(15.17)
(14.17)
(13.37)
(13.44)
(13.98)
(14.23)
(14.09)
(14.15)
(14.77)
(14.07)
(14.04)
(14.81)
(14.05)
(14.67)
(14.39)
(15.40)
(15.28)
(16.45)
(14.98)
(15.17)
(15.64)
(14.64)
TABLE 1
Sum
am
ry Statistics
N
otes: (i) Vegas Favorite (Hom
e) M
ean refers to the m
ean of the Las Vegas spread, PS, from
 the perspective of the favorite (hom
e) team
   (ii) Actual Favorite (Hom
e) M
ean refers to the m
ean of the actual difference in points, DP, from
 the perspective of the favorite (hom
e) team
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Table 2: OLS Results of Difference in Points (DP) on Predicted Vegas Spread (PS) 
  
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1992-2012
Intercept
-0.63
-0.37
1.28
-0.02
-1.02
-0.72
-0.70
-0.93
0.00
0.07
-0.31
-0.72
0.09
-0.51
1.691
-0.28
0.19
0.63
0.48
-0.75
0.17
-0.10
(Standard Error)
1.00
0.96
0.94
0.84
0.95
0.95
0.85
0.89
0.90
0.90
0.89
0.93
0.89
0.88
0.938
0.89
0.96
0.94
0.94
0.91
0.94
0.20
Slope
0.82
0.84
0.95
0.81
0.93
0.86
1.13
0.90
1.10
0.92
0.88
1.16
1.03
1.25
0.875
1.12
1.02
1.13
1.01
1.04
1.19
1.00
(Standard Error)
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.16
0.13
0.14
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.14
0.142
0.12
0.14
0.12
0.16
0.13
0.15
0.03
R
2
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.11
0.25
0.15
0.22
0.14
0.12
0.17
0.16
0.23
0.13
0.24
0.17
0.26
0.14
0.19
0.20
0.17
F-statistic
1.00
0.69
1.59
1.24
0.58
0.50
1.37
0.60
0.32
0.20
0.29
1.32
0.02
2.57
3.36
0.64
0.02
0.62
0.14
0.56
0.83
0.16
observations
224
224
224
240
240
240
240
248
248
248
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
256
5192
TABLE 2
Regression Results for equation (4)
N
otes: The F-statistic for the null hypothesis that parem
eters [α, β] are jointly [0, 1]
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Table 3: Score Differences and Point Spreads for NFL Games 
 
  
Differencing Method/
Sample Partition Games Bets Wins Pushes Wins/Bets t-stat
A1. Home-Away
All Games 5192 5047 2497 145 0.49 -4.16
Home Favorites 3461 3358 1621 103 0.48 -4.79
Home Underdogs 1670 1628 841 42 0.52 -0.60
Pick 'em Games 61 61 35 0 0.57 0.78
A2. Favorite-Underdog 5131 4986 2407 145 0.48 -7.88
Differencing Method/
Sample Partition t-stat
B1. Home-Away
All Games -0.56
Home Favorites 0.00
Home Underdogs -1.01
Pick 'em Games 0.17
B2. Favorite-Underdog 0.61-5.49(13.84) -5.61(3.48) 0.11(13.33)
Notes:  (i) The sample encompasses twenty one regular season NFL games from seasons 1992-2012.
   (ii) Panel A: This panel lists the number of games in the specified partition. Bets refers to the 
number of bets in this partition which do not result in pushes. Wins refers to the number of these 
bets which cover the spread. Wins/Bets is the winning percentage, p , of this betting strategy. t-stat is 
the t-statistic for a t-test of a 1-tailed t-test that p  > 52.4%
   (iii) Panel B: Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. The t-statistic presented tests the 
hypothesis that DP-PS = 0.
4.36(13.78) 4.69(2.91) -0.33(13.42)
0.30(13.90) 0.00(0.00) 0.30(13.90)
-2.63(14.64) -2.53(6.06) -0.10(13.33)
-6.05(13.83) -6.05(3.65) 0.00(13.28)
B. Sample Means and Standard Deviations
DP PS DP-PS
TABLE 3
Score Differences And Point Spreads for NFL Games
A. Sample Frequencies
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Table 4: Results of Betting Strategies on Home Underdogs Partitioned by PS 
 
  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0 < PS < 3
Number 754 - - - -
Win % 0.492 - - - -
p-value (win % < .524) 0.96 - - - -
3 < PS < 7
Number 653 653 653 653 653
Win % 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.55
p-value (win % < .524) 0.99 0.96 0.76 0.47 0.11
7 < PS
Number 263 263 263 263 263
Win % 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.65
p-value (win % < .524) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE 4
Spread Advantage
Notes: (i) PS refers to the Las Vegas spread from the perspective of the 
home team
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Table 5: Betting on Home Underdogs of 7 or More, by Year 
 
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Num
ber
18
13
9
17
11
11
11
12
13
10
9
7
11
10
10
19
16
27
8
14
7
W
in %
0.67
0.46
0.33
0.76
0.45
0.73
0.64
0.50
0.69
0.70
0.67
0.71
0.36
0.30
0.80
0.58
0.50
0.63
0.38
0.71
0.86
P-Value
(w
in%
 < 0.524)
0.11
0.66
0.86
0.02
0.52
0.09
0.24
0.52
0.12
0.14
0.21
0.17
0.84
0.91
0.03
0.32
0.57
0.14
0.78
0.08
0.03
Table 5
Large hom
e underdogs per year
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Figure 1: The Frequency of DP-PS, Viewed from Favorite Perspective 
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Figure 2: The Frequency of DP-PS, Viewed from Home Perspective 
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